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ABSTRACT 
The goal of the present work is to obtain a reasonable solution to the problem of 
object identification. Sensors report on certain independent feature values of an object. 
The Dempster-Shafer theory is used to integrate the information coming from these 
independent sources. Moreover, the sensors do not report he feature values in a crisp 
manner. These values are only stochastically determined. Also, in the data base itself, 
objects only partially belong to classes determined by feature views. This might be due to 
the inability of the expert or expert system to pinpoint exactly the feature value of a given 
object. This setting naturally leads to applying the Dempster-Shafer theory to masses 
whose focal elements are fuzzy sets. A similar approach is taken to produce an 
economical solution to the problem of object identification. A set of sensors is picked 
based on performance evaluation. 
KEYWORDS: feature values, sensors, object identification, pay-offs 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this work, we consider a prob lem that has two distinct but closely 
related aspects. The ult imate goal is to use knowledge systems (KSs) to 
obtain a reasonable solution to the problem of  object identif ication. The 
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KSs provide partial information pertaining to certain features, and the 
system proceeds in a logically coherent manner to put the evidence 
together and arrive at that solution. The related aspects is how to gather 
the needed information. It may be impractical to query all of the KSs. 
Thus, an important component of the problem is to decide how to pick an 
appropriate subset of these KSs. 
A basic tool that will be used in the present work to deal with both 
aspects of the problem mentioned above is the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) 
theory of evidence. This theory was initiated by Dempster [1] in the 
context of statistical inference and further developed by Shafer [2, 3]. This 
theory has important applications in computer vision (Wesley [4]) and in 
artificial intelligence (see, for example, the works of Yager [5], and Yen 
[6]). The present authors have used the Dempster-Shafer approach with 
the integrated problems of decision making and information acquisition 
[7-9]. 
In the first part of the present work, the KSs are to be viewed as sensors 
that report on values of certain features in an imperfect manner. The 
sensors focus on a single object in a list. These objects do not necessarily 
have a single value associated with a given feature. For example, the same 
object, if one focuses on the feature color, may be part blue, part red, and 
part green. The goal is to draw a reasonable conclusion as to what object 
in the list is the focus of the sensors. We call this the problem of object 
recognition. 
The first type of decision that is considered is really made under purely 
stochastic uncertainty. In this case, we have access to the probability of the 
environment under which the decision is made. These possible environ- 
ments are generated by the possible values of the features under consider- 
ation and are fuzzy subsets of the set of possible objects to be recognized. 
Some simple pay-offs are suggested. 
Next we look at more complex pay-offs that reflect how well an object 
fits the environment. Also, we consider cases where the decision maker 
(DM) does not wish to use the Dempster ule of combination. Situations 
where this is the case have been described by L. A. Zadeh [10]. We then 
define a fuzzy set of pay-offs where the decision depends on the DM's 
attitude. In that sense the spirit of decision making is similar to the 
situations in [5]. Finally we discuss the context in which the fuzzy pay-off is 
defined by how well one object may replace another. This notion is 
somewhat similar to the distinguishability function discussed by Anvari and 
Rose in [11]. 
In the second part of the present work, the KSs are knowledge bases. 
The general problem under consideration is to find the right tool to solve a 
specific task. The KSs report on the needed values of some features to 
solve the task. In this setting, the pay-offs need not only reflect how well a 
Object Recognition Problem 143 
tool fits an environment, but also how well one tool may substitute for 
another. 
In the last part of the present work, we assume that it may not be 
practical to access all of the KSs. Techniques imilar to the ones discussed 
previously are developed. A policy of access is developed in terms of 
performance parameters relative to the network of all KSs. This access 
policy combines performance knowledge with "good guesses" as to what 
features hould be examined. Policies of looking at one feature at a time 
as well as policies deciding between competing sets of features are studied. 
Stopping rules based on the uncertainty in selecting an object are 
developed. 
2. MOTIVATON FOR THE PRESENT WORK 
Much attention has been recently paid by the expert systems research 
community to the acquisition of knowledge and reasoning under uncer- 
tainty. There are many different causes for uncertainty. It may be present 
because the terms used in the knowledge domain are ambiguous, or the 
data may be noisy, or the knowledge itself (relating antecedents o conse- 
quences) might only be incomplete. 
To deal with uncertainly, we must develop techniques other than classi- 
cal logic. Statistics is the best tool available to handle likelihood. In many 
situations, however, it is required to estimate probabilities, sometimes 
without even the benefit of relative frequencies. In such case, estimates 
can be very inaccurate. The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence gives 
useful measures for the evaluation of subjective certainty and has recently 
gained in popularity. Fuzzy sets theory is another tool used to deal with 
uncertainty where ambiguous terms are present. Other methods include 
rough sets, the theory of endorsements, and nonmonotonic logic. 
A formal theory of possibility has been proposed by R. Giles [12]. In 
Giles' formulation, the possibility of Proposition A, 7r(A), is the smallest 
fee for which a given agent is willing to contradict Proposition A and agree 
to pay a penalty of $1.00 if Proposition A is found to be true. Thus, "the 
possibility that Carl is in Europe is 0.8" means that if given at least $0.80, 
the agent is willing to state that Carl is not in Europe and pay a penalty of 
$1.00 if his statement is false. It is shown in [12] that the probability of A 
exists if and only if 
7r(A) + rr(-~ A) = 1, 
where -~A denotes the negation of A. In the context of the above 
example, the probability that Carl is in Europe is 0.8 if the agent is also 
willing to state that Carl is in Europe for a fee of $0.20, again agreeing to 
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pay a penalty of $1.00 if his statement is incorrect. Formal properties of 
possibility are established in [12]. 
In [13], consequences of a decision are viewed as belief functions and it 
is shown that a certain type of preference relation on the belief functions 
is characterized (up to affine transformation) by a utility function general- 
izing the von Neumann-Morgenstein utility function. 
In [14], the author contrasts belief functions and probabilities. It is 
pointed out that the belief function reflects the credal belief, whereas 
probabilities reflect the pignistic belief (i.e., betting--belief). It is shown 
how a belief function may generate a pignistic belief (i.e., a probability 
distribution for betting). Finally, in [15] a method is given to remove 
ambiguity in decision making when belief functions are used. (This is the 
case where it is impossible or impractical to assess probability distributions 
with confidence). One solution, when additional information cannot be 
collected, is to make an additional assumption. In this work, an interpola- 
tion for a point-valued utility within the expected utility interval is made. 
This assumption leads to the same decisions as would be obtained if there 
was a probability that ambiguity would be resolved in one's favor. 
In [4] Wesley uses the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence as a 
possible approach to model the "high level" component of vision. The 
problem there is to identify semantically meaningful visual entities in a 
digitized and segmented image of some scene. In the "low-lever' phase, 
scenes are partitioned into regions that are fairly homogeneous with 
respect o some sets of perceivable features in a scene. The purpose of the 
"high-level" component is then to put an appropriate label (such as house, 
tree, grass, water) on the different regions of a scene. Typical image 
features may include spectral information, texture, shape, and spatial 
attributes of regions. For example, if the particular feature is texture, 
possible values for that feature could be relatively rough texture, relatively 
smooth texture, and the containment of both relatively smooth and rough 
textures. If, for example, the image contains relatively rough texture, then 
the observed region could possibly be labeled as tree crown or grass and 
should not be labeled as sky or road. In this way a correspondence is 
established between single values of features and subsets of possible 
labels. A possible difficulty that may be encountered with such an approach 
is that it may not be totally clear what the specific value of a feature is. 
Often information is more complex. The values of the features are not 
deterministic. These values may be given as fuzzy sets or as stochastic 
values. We may, for example, say that according to the information given 
by certain devices, the probability that the object is green is 75% and the 
probability that the object is blue is 25%. The devices may not be able to 
distinguish that well between green and blue. We now need to somewhat 
put a mass of 0.75 on the set of green objects and 0.25 on the set of blue 
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objects. By having information of this form on several independent fea- 
tures and assigning corresponding masses to sets, we again hope to focus 
on a single object, or, at least, on some reasonably small subset. Finally, a 
more realistic situation is that in the knowledge base itself, each object has 
fuzzy features. Thus, an object may a priori not be classified as blue or 
green, but as part blue and part green. This may come about from the 
inability of the expert to make a priori crisp classifications. In that case, 
green would be identified with a fuzzy set of objects. 
From the consideration above, it is clear that masses need, in many real 
world situations, to be defined on fuzzy sets. The focal elements of these 
masses are fuzzy sets of objects corresponding to possible values of the 
features. Because there exists a natural way to combine these masses 
through the Dempster ule of combination, the Dempster-Shafer theory 
constitutes a natural setting for this situation. 
Thus, using masses with fuzzy focal elements has the advantage of 
dealing with two types of uncertainty. On one hand, it provides good 
technical tools to handle uncertainty when the estimate of relevant proba- 
bilities might prove to be inaccurate; it allows the natural integration of 
information coming from independent sources. On the other hand, it deals 
with objects whose classification is not necessarily straightforward. The 
feature values of such objects are given as partially certain only. For 
example, color fails to partition objects because, on one hand, the sources 
of information may not necessarily distinguish sharply between red and 
blue; on the other hand, even the a priori classification i  the knowledge 
base may fail to be crisp. 
In [16] it is pointed out that the plausibility functions of a set of 
consonant focals is equivalent to that of a fuzzy focal. This is shown by 
decomposing a fuzzy focal into level sets; however, consonant support 
functions are more restrictive than possibility distributions in the kind of 
evidence they represent. They are not appropriate for representing multi- 
ple fuzzy focal elements induced from a joint possibility distribution. Also, 
combining consonant support functions does not always yield another 
consonant support function. For these reasons, consonant support func- 
tions will not be considered here. 
3. BACKGROUND AND NOTATION 
Let X = {x1 ,  x 2 . . . . .  Xn}. A fuzzy subset of X is defined by a function 
from X into [0, 1] called the membership function. The notation Ea i /x  i will 
refer to the fuzzy set whose membership functions at x i is a i. If A and B 
are fuzzy subsets of X and if/x A and /x B are their membership functions, 
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(m 1 • mz)(A) = 
when A + 0 ,  and 
then the membership functions of A A B, A v B, and -7 A are 
/z A ^  B(x) = min{ tzA(x ),/xB(x)}, 
/XA v n(x)  = max{ irA(X), /.%(X)}, 
A(x)  = 1 - 
This last expression denotes the fuzzy complement of A. 
By a mass function on X we mean a function m that maps subsets of X 
into real numbers with the properties: 
(i) m(O) = 0, m(A) > 0 and 
(ii) EAcxm(A) = 1. 
Subsets of X over which m is not zero are called focal elements of m. If 
m 1 and m 2 are two masses on X, then the direct sum of m 1 and m 2 [1, 2] 
is defined by 
Y'~ ml(B)m2(C)/ ~ ml(B)m2(C) 
BnC=A Bf~C~O 
(m 1 • m2)(O ) = O. 
This is the Dempster ule of combination [2] which applies when m 1 and 
m E come from independent sources of information. The direct sum repre- 
sents the mass generated by these two sources. This procedure is some- 
times a good model for the situation in which information is gathered from 
independent sources, but this is not always the case. For a further 
discussion of this topic, the reader is referred to the article by L. A. Zadeh 
[10]. In this context, the set X is often called the universe of discourse. 
A mass function m on the universe of discourse X generates two 
important set functions defined on the subsets of X. These are the belief 
and plausibility functions, 
BeI(B) = E m(A),andPls(B) = ~] m(A). 
AcB ANB~O 
In the present work, it will be very natural to extend the above concepts to 
the case where focal elements are fuzzy subsets of the universe of dis- 
course. Treating the focal elements as fuzzy sets was first considered by 
L. A. Zadeh [17]. The reader also is referred to the article by John Yen 
[16] for these and related notions. 
Finally, incorporating the approach of R. Yager [5], we develop the 
possible set of alternatives. This selection is made under an uncertain 
environment. If the probability of each environment is known, then the 
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decision is made by maximizing the average pay-off. If this probability is 
not known, then a rational decision still can be made be defining the DMs 
attitude, the pessimistic attitude, and a combination of both (the Hurwitz 
model). He (Yager) also considers this problem from the point of view of 
regret theory. This general framework is based upon the use of fuzzy sets, 
possibility theory, and the D-S theory of evidence. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Decisions Under Certainty 
Let 01,02,.. . ,  O r denote a list of objects and let F1,  F 2 . . . .  , F n denote a 
list of independent features. For example, F1 could be color, F 2 could be 
size, F 3 could be shape, etc. Let fi k denote a possible value for the feature 
/7i. Thus, if F/denotes color, f/l, f/z, fi 3 could refer to blue, red, and green. 
Of course the range of k depends on i. To each feature i corresponds a 
knowledge system KSi. It is important to understand that KS i reports only 
the valued of the i th feature. To make the situation more realistic, we 
assume that KS~ reports that the object it focuses on has for its i th feature 
the fuzzy set of values 
E dki/fi k" 
k 
That is, the object could be 0.8/blue + 0.1/red + 0.1/green. We assume 
here that 
~d~ = 1. 
k 
In other words, d/~ measures the probability that F i has value Fi k. We may 
view the report KS i as being stochastic in nature; however, it will be 
convenient to retain the fuzzy set notation to express that report. The 
problem of object recognition is to take the information reported by 
KSI ,  KS 2 . . . . .  KS n and to deduce on which object it is most likely that the 
KSs are focusing. (We are, of course, assuming that the KSs are focusing 
on the same object in the list 01 , 0 2 . . . . .  O r , but we do not know which 
one.) Thus, to sum up, independently of any reporting, the value of the ith 
feature for object j is a fuzzy set of the form 
~j = ~ak ~fli k. 
k 
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We now consider the set of objects {01,02 . . . . .  0T} as our universe of 
discourse and identify f/k as a fuzzy subset 
f/k E  4/0j. 
J 
For example, we choose to consider blue as a fuzzy subset of objects. The 
object 01 could be 0.7 blue, 0 2 might be 0.2 blue, etc. We set 
F/k -- E 
J 
Now KSj allows us to define a mass on the fuzzy subsets of objects by 
setting 
mi( Fi k) = dki " 
Because we are assuming that KS i reports in such a manner so that 
Ed/k  = 1, 
k 
it follows that m I is a true mass. The focal elements for each m i are the 
fuzzy sets Fi k where k ranges over possible values of i. 
Two pathological situations could conceivably take place. Different 
values of the same feature could generate identical fuzzy sets of objects; 
e.g., blue and red could generate the same (fuzzy set) A and then m(A)  
would be undefined if the corresponding d/k are different. Also, the 
(imperfect) Ks could indicated a value of some feature for which there is 
no corresponding mass. Note that if we set 
Fi k = G( f f ) ,  
then in the terminology of [18] or [19] G(f f )  is the fuzzy granule of i f ,  and 
we define 
G(fik)=A G(fi )~0 
From now on, we assume that the masses are defined appropriately if the 
above pathological situations arise. From the above discussion, we see that 
KSi generates a mass on fuzzy subsets of objects, and by taking 
m =m 1 (gm 2 • . . .  ~mn,  
we combine the reporting of all the KSs into a single mass. Sharer [2] has 
pointed out that m represents the mass that can be inferred on sets of the 
form Ail A A h N ... • Aj, where Aj~ is a focal elements of mk, provided 
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the masses are generated by independent evidential sources. The formula 
follows by considering compatibility relations from R and S into T and 
combining them into a compatibility relation from R × S into T. Then the 
joint probability distribution of the combined evidential sources is com- 
puted. The combined basic probability is then normalized. This yields 
(m~m2)(A)= Y'+ P(r)P(s)/[1- ~_, P(r)P(s)]. 
G(r)N G(s)=A G(r)A G(s)= 
G(r) and G(s) denote the set of all elements compatible with r and s. Of 
course, P(r) and P(s) are the probabilities of r and s occurring. Here A 
denotes the granule G(r, s) which is the set of all objects compatible with 
feature values r and s. Thus the above combination computes the proba- 
bility of getting granule G(r, s) from independent sources, normalized, so 
we discount conflicting data. For additional details, see [2] and [16]. 
Different authors have extended the D-S theory to fuzzy sets in differ- 
ent ways. All of these authors define the belief over a fuzzy set by 
Bel(B) = ]~_,I(A c B)m(A) 
where I(A c B) denotes the degree to which A is a subset of B. For 
example, M. Ishizuka et al. [20], have defined 
I(A c B) = minx[l, 1 + ( tzB(x ) - tzA(x))]/max x ~A(X). 
Other possible definitions are 
I(A c B) = minx[/x, A(X) V /Xn(X)] (due to Yager), and 
I(A c B) = Emin{ ~A(Xi), tzB(Xi}/E tzn(X i) (due to Ogawa). 
We choose to go with Zadeh's definition of belief and plausibility for fuzzy 
sets. The methods applied here would carry to other definitions of the 
inclusion operator. 
Zadeh [18] defines belief and plausibility for fuzzy sets as 
Bel(B) = ~ in f (A ,  ~ B)m(A~), and 
a 
Pls(B) = ~sup(B  A A.)m(A,). 
o 
Here A a denotes fuzzy subsets that are the focal elements of m. Inf(A, 
B) and sup(B/x A a) are 0 or 1 in the crisp case, and the formulas above 
coincide with belief and plausibility as defined in the previous ection for 
crisp sets. In the context of fuzzy sets, 
Aa ~Bis  ~A~ VB,  
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so that 
inf(A~ = B)= inf Max{1 + /ZAa(X), /*s(X)}; 
x 
sup(B/x Aa) = sup min{/*Ao(x),/*s(x)}. 
x 
Notice that if A~ and B are crisp sets, then inf(A~ ~ B) = 1 if and only if 
max{1 - tzxo(x), ~B(x)} = 1, 
x 
and this is true if and only if A~ c B. On the other hand, 
sup(B AAa)  = 1, 
in the crisp case, if and only if A~ n B ¢= O. This shows the Bel and Pls 
are indeed generalizations of Bel and Pls for crisp sets. 
Having received the KSs reports, we need to make a decision as to what 
object we should recognize. Note that the focal elements of the direct sum 
of m i are the intersections of the focal elements of mi. Thus the focal 
elements of m are fuzzy sets such as blue /x light, red /x heavy, etc., 
assuming that color and weight are the only features. Consequently, in the 
context of our problem, the focal elements of A~ are defined by 
.%= Ae?i 
i 
where the set {k l, k 2 . . . . .  k,} determines A a. 
One way to make a relatively simple decision is to pick the object 0j that 
maximizes Bel{0i}. In the crisp case, recall that Bel corresponds to the 
lower probability of 0j (see [11). Now, 
Bel{Oj} = ~in f (A  a ~ Oj ) (Aa)  , and 




{~ if x = 0j. 
yj(x) = if x#0 j  
inf(A a ~ Oj) = inf [1 - /zAo(x)] = 1 - Max/xA,(x ). 
x#-Oj x~Oj 
Intuitively this says that the degree of inclusion of a fuzzy set such as 
blue v light in 0j is high if any object other than 0j has low membership 
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in blue v light. Thus to recognize the object we compute 
Max Bel{0j} = Max E(1- Max IxA°(x))m(A.). 
J J a xe~Oj 
Maximizing the Belief of {0j} is a conservative decision. Of course, in the 
crisp case, this implication boils down to maximizing the lower probability 
of {0j} given the information regarding the values of the features. In 
general, one would, more realistically, take into account he upper proba- 
bility as well as the lower one. One way to introduce this is to evaluate that 
belief in {Off exceeds the belief in the other competing objects. This 
difference is given by 
which is equal to 
Now, 
Bel{Oj} - Bel{ -1Or} 
Bel{Oj} + PIs{Oj} - 1. 
Pls{Oj} = E sup[Min{Tj(X),lXAo(X)}]m(A.) 
a x 
= y'l, tAo(Oj)m(Aa). 
a 
Thus to recognize the object we compute 
The most general criterion is to maximize ABel{0ff + (1 - A)Pls(0fl. The 
closer A is to 1, the more conservative the decision is. 
We now consider more complex decision-making situations. In [5], 
decisions are made in the context of picking an alternative, while a set of 
possible environments i  under consideration. We need to have a pay-off 
matrix cj, for picking object 0j in some environment S a. Of course we do 
not know what the environment is (otherwise the decision is easy), but we 
may have access to the probability of Sa. In this situation we pick 
Sa= AU 
i 
where, as earlier, {kl, k 2 . . . .  , k n} determine a. 
If flower is one of the objects in our list of possible objects, we may ask: 
What is the pay-off or picking flower if the environment is blue /x light as 
opposed to black /x heavy? Intuitively, the pay-off should be higher in the 
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blue /x light environment. We now give some suggestions as to how cja 
might be picked. The pay-offs depend, of course, on the specific problems 
under consideration. Once pay-offs are picked, one may maximize the 
average pay-off (a standard approach) or if the appropriate probabilities 
(in this case, the probabilities for environment Sa) are not available, then 
other decisions might be made (decision under environmental uncertainty). 
Generally speaking, one cannot use the same general ogic for pay-offs as 
we did for beliefs. One can consider absolute pay-offs or how much a 
pay-off exceeds the competition. A straightforward approach is to set 
ci, = Min { g~/}, 
l 
where, of course, k l ,  k 2 . . . . .  k n determines a, and /z~/ denotes the mem- 
bership of object 0j in fuzzy set F/k~. In this case, cja is simply the 
membership of 0y in S~. It is a straightforward measure of how much 0j fits 
the environment S~. Another choice for Cja is 
c j~=Min{t t~ '} -  ~ Min{p~}i}, 
t l , . . . , t  n l 
where (t I . . . . .  t,) determines /3 with S~ # S a, and the summation is over 
all (tl . . . . .  t,) determining a different environment than (k 1 . . . . .  k,). This 
is a measure of how much better 0y fits Sa than competing environments. 
At any rate, we assume that some pay-off function cjo is present. In 
subsequent sections we develop different types of decision making. 
4.2. Similarity Coefficients 
Yet another approach is to introduce the similarity matrix sji [11, 21]. 
Here 0 < sji < 1, and sji is a measure of how successfully object 0j may 
replace object 0 i. Note that sj~ is, in general, not symmetrical ([21], p. 196). 
If we take this approach, then we have to change our views of the KSs 
somewhat. These should not be regarded as sensors anymore, but rather as 
knowledge bases. We would like to find the right tool to solve a specific 
problem. Our KSs give us imperfect reporting on what tool we should 
choose. Also, we have some information given by sji on how well 01. (the jth 
tool) may functionally replace 0 i (the ith tool). We then set 
Cja = ES j t  Min{/z~i,}. 
t t 
This defines a high pay-off for selecting 0j in environment S a if 0j is a 
good replacement for objects with high membership in S a. This pay-off 
function combines the degree of membership of object 0j in environment 
Sa together with how much {0j} can replace {0,}. With this kind of function, 
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the pay-off is high if {0j.} replaces well the objects with high membership in
S~. Recalling that a mass can be seen as a probability distribution on the 
power set of the universe of discourse, the probability of environment S, is 
Pr (S , )  = m(Sa)  = m( ~i Fik')" 
Thus the probability of the environment is obtained by meshing the 
(imperfect) reports of the KSs. 
We now make our selection by computing 
Max ~'~Cjam( Sa). 
J a 
This type of decision is called decision under purely stochastic uncertainty 
because the probabilities of the environments are known. Here we are 
maximizing the average pay-off. 
EXAMPLE 1 Say we have three objects 01, 02, 03 and two features; say, 
color and size. The color takes on two values (red and blue) and the size 
has two values (large and small). These sets are defined as follows: 
blue = 0.8/01 + 0.6/02 + 0.3/03 
red = 0.5/01 + 0.7/02 + 0.8/03 
large = 0.6/01 + 0.9/02 + 0.6/03 
small = 0.4/01 + 0.7/02 + 0.6/03 
The observed object has the following values 
0.7/blue + 0.3/red 
0.8/large + 0.2/small 
The focal elements for mcolo r are blue, red, and 
mcolor(blue ) = 0.7, mcolor(red) = 0.3 
Similarly, 
msize(large ) = 0.8, msize(small) = 0.2 
Now we define the environments 
E l = blue A large; 
E 2 = blue A small; 
E 3 = red A large; 
E 4 = red A small; 
m(E 1) = mcolor(blue)msize(large) = (0.7)(0.8) = 0.56 
Similarly, 
m(E2) = 0.14; m(E3) = 0.24; m(E4) = 0.06. 
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We now define the similarity matrix 
[ ] 1 0.7 0.6 S = 0.7 1 0 .8 .  
0.6 0.8 1 
Possible pay-offs are 
C u = (0.6)(1) + (0.6)(0.7) + (0.3)(0.6) = 1.2 
C12 = (0.4)(1) + (0.6)(0.7) + (0.3)(0.6) = 1.0 
C13 = (0.5)(1) + (0.7)(0.7) + (0.6)(0.6) = 1.35 
C~4 = (0.4)(1) + (0.7)(0.7) + (0.6)(0.6) = 1.25 
C21 = (0.6)(0.7) + (0.6)(1) + (0.3)(0.8) = 1.2 
C22 = (0.4)(0.7) + (0.6)(1) + (0.3)(0.8) = 1.12 
C23 = (0.5)(0.7) + (0.7)(1) + (0.6)(0.8) = 1.53 
C24 = (0.4)(0.7) + (0.7)(1) + (0.6)(0.8) = 1.46 
C31 = (0.6)(0.6) + (0.6)(0.8) + (0.3)(1) = 1.14 
C32 = (0.4)(0.6) + (0.6)(0.8) + (0.3)(1) = 1.02 
C33 = (0.5)(0.6) + (0.7)(0.8) + (0.6)(1) = 1.46 
C34 = (0.4)(0.6) + (0.7)(0.8) + (0.6)(1) = 1.4 
We now compute 
y,4_ 1Cljm(Ej ) = 1.211 
Z,~-1C2jm(Ej) 2.716 
Y',~= 1C3jm(Ej) 1.2156 
Thus, we would pick 02 . This type of decision would favor 03 over 01 . 
4.3. Decisions Under Uncertainty 
In certain situations it is not viable to apply the combinat ion rule to 
obtain m as we have done above. A discussion on the applicability of the 
rule of combinat ion is given in [10]. I f  the DM does not feel that the rule 
of combinat ion is warranted, then a decision under uncertainty must be 
made as the probabil it ies of the environment are unknown. 
We choose in this case to view the environment as a fuzzy set E of fuzzy 
nature states given by F/k' with membersh ip  dk' in E. Let cjk ~ denote the 
pay-off  in selecting Oj if the state of nature is F/k~. Again, following 
previous ideas, we may define the pay-off  in several ways: 
Cjk  i = ].Z ki or  
Cjk ' = /z k' + Ek,+l,,tz)l'; or 
cjk, Et sjt tzkt/. 
The interpretation of these formulas is similar to the one given previously 
for the different pay-offs when the combinat ion rule was applied. Of  
course, the pay-off  function depends very much on the nature of the 
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problem. We now define fuzzy sets of pay-offs by setting 
where 
cj = E d '/Cjk,, 
i,ki 
mi( Fik~) = dki ,. 
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Following the spirit of [5], we now define the attitude of the DM. When 
decisions are made under uncertainty, the attitude of the decision maker 
shapes the decision. There are four main attitudes: pessimistic, optimistic, 
in-between, and minimizing the regret function. For more details, see [5]. 
For the pessimistic DM, we select 0j by computing 
Max Min c j, 
J 
that is, we maximize the smallest pay-off. Of course cj is a fuzzy set and we 
have to give meaning to Min c i. Following [23], we set 
cj[A ] = {tlcj(t) > A} (1) 
where cj(t) denotes the membership of t in cj. Then, Min c][A] denotes 
the smallest Cjk i for which d~' > A. We define 
Min cj = f01 Min cj[ A] dA. (2) 
To understand the above notation, we write the d~,'s as an ordered set, 
d 1 <d z< ... <d  w. 
Then Min cj can be written 
d 1Min +(d  2 -d  1) Min +. . .+  
dki,>_dl Cjki d~>d2 Cjki 
+(dw - dw_l)  Min (3) dki,> d~ cjki" 
For the optimistic DM, we select 0j by computing 
Max Max c j, 
J 
where 
f01 Max cj = Max cj[ A] dA. 
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The right-hand side of the above expression is analogous to expression (3) 
with min replaced by max. Maximizing a convex combination of Min cj and 
Max cj will yield the Hurwitz strategy. 
Finally, the computation analogous to the approach dictated by regret 
theory would involve finding 
where 
fo 
Max Min Rj[ A] dA, 
J 
Ri = E Max cj]. 
i ,k  i 
Rj is the fuzzy regret and cj~, - Max cj is the regret that comes with 
picking 0j in the environment F, k,. 
We now construct another selection where we are willing to use the 
combination rule and pay attention to functional substitution; that is, we 
have the matrix sji's as defined earlier. In this case, as already discussed, 
the KSs are not sensors, but knowledge bases indicating the features of 
the tool needed to solve a specific problem. This approach somewhat 
combines the previous methods. Define the pay-off of selecting object j, 
while object i is the object on which the KSs focus, as sji. We define a 
fuzzy set of pay-offs by 
cj(a) = E Min{ t.£ktii}/Sjt . 
t 
This represents the pay-off of selecting 0j, while the environment is S a 
where a is determined by (k 1, k 2 . . . . .  k,). It is an indicator of how well 0j 
may replace objects 0 t and at the same time keeps track of how well 0 t fits 
into the environment S,. We can now perform computations similar to the 
previous ones, reflecting any one of the four attitudes that the DM may 
have. For example, for pessimistic attitude we set 
Izj( a) = Min cj( a) 
where the rain of fuzzy set cj(a) is defined by expressions analogous to (1), 
(2), and (3). We then compute 
Max Elzj( a)m( Sa). 
t a 
If we wanted to use the regret approach, then we would define the fuzzy 
regret by 
ki Rj(a) = ~. Min{ iz t ,} / [s j , -  Maxcj(a)],  
t t 
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and then find 




EXAMPLE 2 We pick object 01, 02, 03, the similarity matrix S as in the 
previous example. The environment E is given by 
0 .7/b lue + 0 .3 / red  + 0.8/ large + 0.2/smal l  
The crisp pay-offs are computed as 
Cll = (1)(0.8) + (0.7)(0.6) + (0.6)(0.3) = 1.40; 
C12 = (1)(0.5) + (0.7)(0.7) + (0.6)(0.8) = 1.47; 
C13 = (1)(0.6) + (0.7)(0.9) + (0.6)(0.3) = 1.41; 
C~4 = (1)(0.4) + (0.7)(0.7) + (0.6)(0.6) = 1.25. 
Similarly, 
C21 = 1.4; C22 = 1.69; C23 ~-- 1.56; C24 = 1.46; 
C31 = 1.26; C32 = 1.66; C33 = 1.38; C34 = 1.4. 
We now compute the Fuzzy Pay-Offs: 
C 1 = 0.7/1.4 + 0.3/1.47 + 0.8/1.41 + 0.2/1.25; 
C 2 = 0.7/1.4 + 0.3/1.69 + 0.8/1.56 + 0.2/1.46; 
C a = 0.7/1.26 + 0.3/1.66 + 0.8/1.38 + 0.2/1.4. 
Let's assume that the attitude of the DM is pessimistic. We need to 
compute Min cj. 
CI[A] = {t/Cj(t) > A}, SO 
C1[0.2] = {1.25, 1.47, 1.4, 1.41}; 
C1[0.3] = {1.47, 1.4, 1.41}; 
C1[0.7] = {1.4, 1.41}; 
C1[0.8] = {1.41}. 
Min C~ = (0.2)(1.25) + (0.1)(1.4) + (0.4)(1.4) + (0.1)(1.41) = 1.09. 
Similarly, 
Min C 2 = 1.14; 
Min C a = 1.02. 
The pessimistic DM will again select 02 and will favor 01 over 03. 
Of course, it is very conceivable that this example might have given 
different decisions where less is known as we do not have the probability 
of the environments. 
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For example, if we look at the optimistic DM, we have 
MaxC 1 = (0.2)(1.47) + (0.1)(1.47) + (0.4)(1.41) + (0.1)(1.41) = 1.15 
Similarly, 
Max C 2 = 1.29; 
MaxC 3 = 1.19. 
Again, the optimistic DM will pick 02. Once again, he will favor 03 over 01. 
We have examined several contexts for decision making. These contexts 
included environments defined by integrating the information given by the 
KSs and pay-offs defined on how well the objects fit the environment. 
Environments defined by individual KSs (integration of information via 
the direct sum not taking place) and the (fuzzy) pay-offs defined by how 
well an object could replace other objects. In addition to the context, the 
attitude of the DM was of importance. 
4.4. Subsets of KSs 
We now assume that it may not be practical to pick all of the available 
features. It might prove to be too expensive, or some KSs might be too 
unreliable, or if we have an idea of what the object is, some features might 
be far more important han others. We can select features by looking at 
one feature at a time or by selecting a subset of KSs to run in parallel. 
If we elect to consider one feature at a time, then we assume that in 
addition to the KSs, we have control knowledge systems (CKSs) that yield 
information on performance parameters of the KSs. For example, cost 
could be a performance parameter and could take on the values cheap, 
reasonable, and expensive. Reliability could be another performance param- 
eter and take on the values somewhat reliable, reliable, and very reliable. 
These parameters play a role analogous to the role of the features in the 
original object recognition problem, except hat the universe of discourse 
is now the set of KSs. We are assuming that each CKS reports on a single 
performance characteristic, but globally with respect to the network of 
KSs rather than on each individual KS. Thus cheap and reliable are fuzzy 
sets of KSs, and environments are fuzzy sets such as cheap A reliable or 
reasonable A somewhat reliable. Also, each CKS adds information on how 
cheap or how reliable the networks of KSs is. Thus each CKS reports on 
the global set of KSs in the form 
y~ erjp r, 
r 
where s is a performance parameter (such as cost), pr denotes the r th 
value of the parameter, and e r denotes the membership of the whole set of 
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KSs for the r th value of performance characteristic s. However, p~ is itself 
a fuzzy set. Specifically, 
P; = E Xg,/KSg. 
g 
This fuzzy set is, of course, defined a priori to any reporting of the CKSs 
and plays the role of F/k in the previous sections. Thus p,~ indicates the 
performance KSg relative to the value of p~ for parameter s. 
We now take advantage of the fact that each CKS reports on the 
performance of the network as a whole. This mode of reporting allows us 
to define masses n, on fuzzy subsets of KSs by 
n,(P  r)~ = e r. 
We define performance nvironments by 
s 
where (r 1 . . . . .  ) determine /3. The pay-offs can be defined in a manner 
similar to the pay-offs in the previous sections. A particular KS* then can 
be selected. We could use any of the criteria previously discussed. For 
example, we could pick KS/* such that i* satisfies 
[ \ 
Max y- (1 - Max lXA,(y ) )n(At ) ,  
k t y~KSk 
where A t denotes the t th focal elements of n and n = n I • n 2 • .... 
We have to determine if picking the feature i* (and therefore, having 
KS* report) is enough to recognize the object. If 07 is the object recog- 
nized by KS* alone, we consider 
Pls{07} - Bel{07} = Y'~ (p~A,(OT) + Max/z~,(x) - 1)m*(At) .  
x~0] '  t 
This quantity measures the uncertainty surrounding the choice of 07 . If 
this falls below a certain threshold, then feature i* is sufficient. Otherwise, 
consider the set of KSg with KS* deleted. Compute again the qualities 
above to get the feature h* and then recompute the uncertainty where m~' 
is replaced by m* • m~,. Of course, the new A t will be the intersection of 
focal elements of m* and m~. We continue this process. We expect hat as 
more features are added, /XA(07) will, hopefully, converge to 1, whereas 
Max x , o7 i.tA (x ) will converge to 0. Consequently, 
PIs{O~} - Bel{O~} 
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should converge to 0. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that 
uncertainty will decrease to 0 as more and more independent features are 
added, although we have no formal proof that this will always happen. 
Once the uncertainty has fallen below a certain threshold, the object that 
is the current entative choice (i.e., the object used to make the uncertainty 
computation) is selected. Of course, we still cannot be sure about the 
correctness of the selection. What has happened here is that the lower and 
upper probability has converged to the same value. That value is the 
regular probability of selecting {07}. We have removed fuzzy uncertainty 
from the selection, in the sense that information indicating that the object 
that is under consideration might be {07} or -~ {07}. Stochastic uncertainty 
remains and is determined by the common value of the lower and upper 
probability. 
Another idea is to pick the feature i*, as indicated earlier, based on 
performance. Then we pick 07 using the feature i*. Now with each object 
07 is associated a list L~ of features to be considered. The rationale here is 
that for each candidate object, there is a natural list of features that 
should be examined. If the uncertainty on 07 is small enough, we pick 07. 
Otherwise, consider the features on L~ and apply the corresponding KSs. 
If the uncertainty on 07 is not low enough or if 07 still is not the first 
choice, then go back to performance considerations and pick the feature 
h* as indicated above. Continue until the uncertainty is low enough. This 
approach combines performance consideration with good guesses as to 
what the right features are. 
Finally, we now consider the case where we have to choose among 
competing sets of KSs. Let G o be a typical set of KSs that we consider 
running in parallel. Let E ~ be the corresponding environment, 
E~ A r~. .. . = Ps , G .  = {KSg, ,  . ,  KSg,} 
s 
We can define the pay-offs by 
C.o = ~ Min {Ages}, 
J 
Cos+ )'-'. [Min {A~,,} - ~ j  g*sj Min{A~,}]. 
The first pay-off reflects how well the set {KSg~ . . . . .  KSg,} fits the environ- 
ment E ~ over other competing sets of KSs. We compute 
Max E C,,n( E " ) 
t, 13 
where n is the direct sum of all cases of n~ as previously defined. Other 
methods, similar to the ones previously discussed, could be considered. 
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5. SUMMARY 
We have proposed possible solutions to the problem of object identifi- 
cation, and have available a fuzzy database. An object may only belong 
partially to a class or classes of objects having certain feature values. This 
reflects the inability of the expert to properly classify objects. In addition, 
knowledge systems report stochastically on the feature values of an object. 
To integrate the incoming information, we note it is convenient to convert 
the knowledge systems reports to masses. Because the database is fuzzy, 
the focal element of these masses are fuzzy sets. To make a decision, we 
note a pay-off unction should be available. The pay-off unction is highly 
dependent on the nature of the problem, and once such a function is 
available, a so-called decision under certainty can be made if probabilities 
associated with the environment are known. If we integrate the incoming 
information via the Dempster ule of combination, then decisions under 
certainty can be made. If we do not wish to integrate the information, then 
alternate ways to make decisions can be developed. Such alternate ways 
depend on the decision-maker's attitude. We have considered four fairly 
typical attitudes. 
Certain pay-offs were suggested. In particular, the problem where one 
object could to some degree, functionally replace another was briefly 
discussed. 
A similar approach was considered when consideration was given to 
what knowledge systems hould be queried. Performance characteristics 
played a role somewhat analogous to feature values and were the driving 
factors for this type of decision. 
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